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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                 
 
 
PRATT, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
 The operative facts giving rise to this mandamus application 
are set forth in the civil complaint of respondents Alan D. 
Lindsey and Randall Coughanour.  In September 1991 Lindsey and 
Coughanour were involved in disputes with security guards at an 
indoor shopping mall on Route 51 in West Mifflin Borough, just 
south of Pittsburgh, Pa.  They had travelled to the mall to shop, 
but upon their arrival, they were "harassed, threatened, and 
assaulted" by the security guards.  When the guards refused their 
request that the police be summoned, Lindsey and Coughanour 
themselves telephoned the West Mifflin Police Department 
requesting assistance.  West Mifflin Police Officer Evan, one of 
the petitioners in this mandamus application, responded to the 
call.  Evan refused to arrest or admonish any of the guards, but 
told Lindsey and Coughanour to leave the mall and never come 
back; otherwise, they would be arrested. 
 The following day, Lindsey returned to the mall in an 
attempt to talk to someone from the DeBartolo organization, which 
owned the mall, to find out why he had been accosted and why he 
was not permitted on the mall without permission.  During the 
next three weeks Lindsey repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted 
to contact Sam Vindovich, the mall manager, one of the defendants 
in the underlying action, to find out why he and Coughanour were 
banned from the mall.  Lindsey finally consulted his present 
counsel, who advised him that the law permitted his entrance to 
the mall as long as the mall was open to the public.   
 On September 27, 1991, Lindsey and Coughanour returned to 
the mall to shop, but were accosted and handcuffed in the mall 
men's room, and then dragged through the mall corridor to mall 
offices to await the arrival of Officer Evan. 
 Evan then wrote out summary offense citations for disorderly 
conduct and defiant trespass.  Lindsey and Coughanour were 
photographed by a Polaroid camera, and the photographs were at-
tached to printed forms that said "DEFIANT TRESPASS".  These 
paper forms contained, among other things a warning that, if 
Lindsey and Coughanour came onto the mall property again, they 
would be arrested.  These preprinted forms were then displayed on 
a bulletin board in the mall at the security offices for everyone 
passing in front of the board to see.  
 The handcuffs were then removed, and Lindsey and Coughanour 
were ordered to leave the mall, separately, which they did.  They 
were prosecuted and convicted in Common Pleas Court on charges 
stemming from the incidents at the mall, but on February 26, 
1993, a three judge panel of the Superior Court in Allegheny 
County vacated the convictions and discharged them. 
 Lindsey and Coughanour then filed a seven count complaint in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 
claiming that they had committed no crimes while at the mall and 
that they had been maliciously abused and prosecuted.  As 
defendants, they named the Borough of West Mifflin and Officer 
Evan ("the municipal defendants"), who are the petitioners in 
this mandamus proceeding, as well as the owners, supervisors, and 
security officers of the mall ("the DeBartolo defendants").  
Specifically, Lindsey and Coughanour alleged: (1) state law 
claims of malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, 
assault, and conspiracy against all defendants; (2) a negligence 
claim against the municipal defendants; (3) a negligence claim 
against the DeBartolo defendants; and (4) a federal claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 which alleged that the municipal defendants and 
the DeBartolo defendants conspired to deprive Lindsey and 
Coughanour of their civil rights through harassment, assault, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process in 
violation of the 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments.  
 Relying on the federal civil rights claim, the municipal 
defendants filed a notice of removal from the state court to the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  Lindsey and Coughanour then moved to remand the 
case back to state court.  Magistrate Judge Kenneth J. Benson 
recommended a remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) of the entire 
case, including the § 1983 claim.  He found that  
 [t]he issues of state law clearly predominate in this 
matter.  Not only do they predominate with respect to 
the state law claims, but there is also a predominance 
of state law issues with respect to the single claim 
pursuant to § 1983.   
 
United States District Judge Gary L. Lancaster adopted the report 
and recommendation "as the opinion of the court" and entered a 
two page Memorandum and Order granting Lindsey and Coughanour's 
motion to remand the entire case.   
 The municipal defendants now seek in this court a writ of 
mandamus to compel Judge Lancaster to accept jurisdiction of this 
action, which, they contend, was properly removed under § 1441(a) 
and (b).  They argue that by remanding the entire case under 
§ 1441(c), Judge Lancaster exceeded his authority. 
 DISCUSSION 
 Preliminarily, it is clear that we have jurisdiction to 
review the district court's remand order.  While appellate review 
of remands is somewhat restricted (see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); 
Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1354-55 (3rd Cir. 1993)), this 
case, which was removed because it included a § 1983 civil rights 
claim brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, falls within the 
specific exception to § 1447(d), which states that 
 an order remanding a case to the State court from which 
it was removed pursuant to section 1443 ["civil rights 
cases"] of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or 
otherwise. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Thus, Congress has demonstrated a special 
concern to preserve our power to review remand orders in civil 
rights cases. 
 
 A.  Federal Jurisdiction Generally. 
 Removal and remand issues must be considered in light of the 
general principles of federal subject matter jurisdiction.  There 
are several sources for original jurisdiction in the federal 
courts:  federal question jurisdiction of civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 
28 U.S.C. § 1331; diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000, and is 
between citizens of different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and other 
specific jurisdictional statutes, such as RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, 
et. seq.; Civil Rights Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1443; ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002, et. seq.; and FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51-60. 
 In addition,  
 * * * in any civil action of which the district courts 
have original jurisdiction [except diversity cases], 
the district courts shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 
to claims in the action within such original jurisdic-
tion that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Section 1367 also grants jurisdiction over 
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional 
parties, thereby codifying what had been dubbed "pendent-party" 
jurisdiction as well as some forms of "ancillary" jurisdiction.  
Thus § 1367 provides federal courts with statutory authority to 
hear some claims that lack an independent basis for federal 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
 B.  Removal Jurisdiction Generally. 
 Cases begun in state court over which a federal court may 
also have jurisdiction can be removed by the defendants under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 ("Actions removable generally"). 
 Section 1441(a) reads in relevant part: 
 (a)  Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have 
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant 
or the defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the 
place where such action is pending.  For purposes of 
removal under this chapter, the citizenship of 
defendants sued under fictitious names shall be 
disregarded. 
 
 Under (a), therefore, unless otherwise barred by Congress, 
any civil action brought in a state court (plaintiff's choice) 
over which a federal district court would have original 
jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant (defendant's choice) 
to a district court.  This would include both federal question 
and diversity cases as well as the miscellaneous federal 
jurisdiction cases.   
 In the case now before us, Lindsey's and Coughanour's state 
court action included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which 
the federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343, plus a variety of state law claims arising out of the same 
events and circumstances, over which the federal court has 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.  Because the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction, the action was properly 
removed from state court under § 1441(a). 
 Under § 1441(b) diversity cases have an additional obstacle 
to removal:  a resident defendant is barred from removing to 
federal court.  If jurisdiction is based on a federal question, 
however, there is no residency restriction.  This shows an added 
concern of Congress that cases such as this one -- civil rights 
claims raising federal questions -- should be permitted to be 
heard in federal courts.  
 
 C.  Application of § 1441(c). 
 The dispute on this mandamus application focuses on the 
effect of subdivision (c) of § 1441.  That provision, prior to 
1990, read: 
 Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of 
action, which would have been removable if sued upon 
alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case 
may be removed and the district court may determine all 
issues therein, or, in its discretion, remand all 
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.   
 
In 1990, Congress amended § 1441(c) in a manner which the parties 
contend affects our decision in this case.  See Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 312, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5114 (1990).  Section 1441(c) now reads: 
 Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of 
action within the jurisdiction of 1331 of this title is 
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims 
or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and 
the district court may determine all issues therein, 
or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which 
State law predominates. 
 
 In enacting the amendment to § 1441(c), Congress altered two 
provisions of the statute.  First, it replaced the phrase "a 
separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would 
have been removable if sued upon alone" with "a separate and 
independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction of 
1331 of this title".  Second, it replaced the phrase "the 
district court may . . . remand all matters not otherwise in its 
original jurisdiction" with "the district court may . . . remand 
all matters in which State law predominates." 
 A fair reading of the Congressional intent in enacting the 
amendment to § 1441(c) is that it was designed to restrict 
removal to only those cases falling within the court's federal 
question jurisdiction and to bring the remand provisions into 
harmony with 28 U.S.C. § 1367, thereby possibly avoiding 
piecemeal litigation.  See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 
and 1990 Revisions to Section 1441, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1994). 
 In the present case, the district court relied upon the 
addition which reads "the district court may . . . remand all 
matters in which State law predominates" to remand the entire 
case, including the § 1983 claim, to state court.  It did so 
without regard for the requirement, which the Congress left 
unchanged when it amended § 1441(c), that the federal cause of 
action removed by the municipal defendants had to be "separate 
and independent" from the state causes of action. 
 Thus, § 1441(c) provides for removal or remand only where 
the federal question claims are "separate and independent" from 
the state law claims with which they are joined in the complaint.  
However, where there is a single injury to plaintiff for which 
relief is sought, arising from an interrelated series of events 
or transactions, there is no separate or independent claim or 
cause of action under § 1441(c).  American Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).  Suits involving pendent (now "supple-
mental") state claims that "derive from a common nucleus of 
operative fact", see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
725 (1966), do not fall within the scope of 1441(c), since 
pendent claims are not "separate and independent".  Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988). 
 It is apparent, then, that "§ 1441(c) grants the district 
court only a limited authority to remand a case."  Kabealo v. 
Davis, 829 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (citing to Buchner 
v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1993)).  In Kabealo, the 
plaintiff had brought a federal claim under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et. 
seq, along with state law claims of engaging in a pattern of 
corrupt activity under Ohio law, breach of fiduciary duty, breach 
of contract, and fraud.  Defendant filed a notice of removal, and 
the plaintiffs moved for remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).  The 
district court of Ohio concluded that some cases had analyzed 
§ 1441(c) too broadly, and held, as petitioners have argued here, 
that: 
 Even if it is assumed that § 1441(c) would authorize 
the remand of an entire case, including federal claims, 
plaintiff must establish that remand of this case would 
be appropriate under 1441(c).  That  section provides 
for removal or remand only where the federal claims are 
"separate and independent" from the state law claims 
with which they are joined in the complaint [citing 
authorities].  Where there is a single injury to 
plaintiff for which relief is sought, arising from an 
interrelated series of events or transactions, there is 
no separate and independent claim or cause of action 
under 1441(c).  American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 
341 U.S. 6 (1951).  The use of different counts to 
plead different legal theories or multiple theories of 
recovery does not automatically make those counts 
separate and independent. 
 
Kabealo, 829 F. Supp. at 926.  The court then found that because 
the plaintiff in that case relied on the same set of facts for 
all counts of the complaint, including the RICO count, § 1441(c) 
did not authorize remand, because the federal claims were not 
separate and independent under that section. 
 Kabealo, drawing heavily upon Buchner, stands alone among 
the district courts in having reached the same conclusion as 
Buchner reached and as we reach here.  Other district courts have 
apparently read the 1990 amendments as broadening rather than 
narrowing the scope of their discretion to remand.  We cannot 
agree. 
 For instance, in Moore v. DeBiase, 766 F. Supp. 1311 (D.N.J. 
1991), the complaint presented allegations similar to the 
allegations found in the present case.  Moore had accused 
DeBiase, a police supervisor, of malicious abuse of authority, 
abuse of police procedure, a conspiracy to terminate Moore, 
defamation, and violation of § 1983 by depriving him of his 
"rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States 
Constitution and New Jersey Law."  Id. at 1314.  Moore also 
sought damages against the Borough of Dunnellen and the Dunnellen 
Police Department under conspiracy and respondeat superior 
theories.  Id. 
 Without determining that Moore's § 1983 claim was "separate 
and independent" from his state law claims, the district court 
remanded all of Moore's claims, including his § 1983 claim.  It 
did so in the belief that the phrase "all matters in which State 
law predominates" in § 1441(c) permits the remand of even federal 
claims within the district court's original federal jurisdiction 
if, in the discretion of the district court, state law 
predominated in the action as a whole. 
 As we have pointed out, however, unless the federal question 
claims removed by the defendant were "separate and independent" 
from the state law claims, § 1441(c) cannot apply and the 
district court must retain the federal claim.  Hence, the 
district court's discretion to remand under § 1441(c) can pertain 
only to those state law claims which the district court could 
decline to hear under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  (See Section 4 infra  
"Application of § 1367(c)").  Thus, we reject the reasoning of 
Moore v. DeBiase and those courts which have adopted its 
rationale.  See, e.g. Holland v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 764 F. 
Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Martin v. Drummond Coal Co., Inc., 
756 F. Supp. 524 (N.D. Ala. 1991). 
 Similarly in the present case, Lindsey and Coughanour rely 
on the same series of events for all counts of their complaint, 
including the federal § 1983 count; therefore, the federal claim 
is not separate and independent under 1441(c), and the district 
court had no authority to remand the case under that section. 
 
 D.  Application of § 1367(c). 
 The plaintiffs insist that, even if the district court was 
not authorized to remand this entire case under § 1441(c), its 
action should be sustained under the authority of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c) which gives a district court discretion to decline to 
hear certain state claims it would have supplemental jurisdiction 
to entertain under § 1367(a).  We disagree for two reasons.  
First, nothing in § 1367(c) authorizes a district court to 
decline to entertain a claim over which is has original 
jurisdiction and, accordingly, that section clearly does not 
sanction the district court's remand of this entire case, 
including the civil rights claims, to the state court. 
 Further, § 1367(c) cannot legitimately be invoked to affirm 
even the district court's remand of the state claims to the state 
court.  While we agree with plaintiffs that the discretion 
bestowed by § 1367(c) exists with respect to removed claims as 
well as claims filed initially in the district court, it is 
apparent that the district court has not exercised that 
discretion in this case.  The magistrate judge's opinion, adopted 
by the district court, refers only to § 1441(c) and it is 
apparent from that opinion that the court remanded the entire 
case based solely on the authority of that section.  Moreover, 
the result of an exercise of discretion under § 1367(c) in 
circumstances like those before the district court would have 
been two parallel proceedings, one in federal court and one in 
the state system, and a district court cannot properly exercise 
its discretion under § 1367(c) without taking that fact into 
account.  The district court's § 1441(c) analysis accordingly 
cannot serve as a surrogate for a § 1367(c) analysis that was not 
conducted. 
 As we have indicated, § 1367(c) is potentially applicable in 
a removed case involving federal claims and state claims over 
which the district court has supplemental jurisdiction.  A dis-
trict court may thus be called upon to exercise its discretion at 
any time during the course of such a proceeding in light of the 
circumstances that then exist.  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.  Because 
the district court in this case may hereafter be called upon to 
exercise its discretion under § 1367(c), we offer the following 
guidance. 
 Subsection (a) of § 1367 directs that "in any civil action 
of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all 
other claims that are so related to [the original jurisdiction 
claims] that they form part of the same case or controversy."  
Subsection (c) goes on to describe four categories of such claims 
which the district courts may nevertheless decline to adjudicate: 
 (c) The district courts may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection 
(a) if -- 
 
  (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of 
State law, 
 
  (2) the claim substantially predominates over 
the claim or claims over which the district 
court has original jurisdiction, 
 
  (3) the district court has dismissed all 
claims over which it has original juris-
diction, or 
 
  (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are 
other compelling reasons for declining 
jurisdiction. 
 
 While § 1367(c) does not specify what disposition the 
district court is to make of state claims it decides not to hear, 
based on the teachings of Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 343, we 
believe that in a case that has been removed from a state court, 
a remand to that court is a viable alternative to a dismissal 
without prejudice.  See Balazik v. County of Dauphin, No. 94-
7350, slip op. at 15-17 (3d. Cir. January 5, 1995). 
 Section 1367(a)'s grant of "supplemental" jurisdiction was 
intended to broaden the preexisting scope of what had previously 
been termed "pendent" jurisdiction to include claims involving 
the addition of parties.  H.R. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6875.  
Section 1367(c), on the other hand, was intended simply to codify 
the preexisting pendent jurisdiction law, enunciated in Gibbs and 
its progeny, concerning those instances in which a district court 
is authorized to decline to hear a state claim it would have the 
power to hear because of its relationship to an original federal 
jurisdiction claim.  H.R. Rep. No. 416, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875 
(Subsection 1367(c) "codifies the factors that the Supreme Court 
has recognized as providing legitimate bases upon which a 
district court may decline jurisdiction over a supplemental 
claim, even though it is empowered to hear the claim.").  It is 
of particular importance in the present context to note that the 
"substantially predominates" standard found in § 1367(c)(2) comes 
directly from the Supreme Court's opinion in Gibbs and should be 
understood in that context.  The Court there explained the 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as follows: 
 It has consistently been recognized that pendent 
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of 
plaintiff's right.  Its justification lies in 
considerations of juridical economy, convenience and 
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a 
federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction 
over state claims, even though bound to apply state law 
to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.  
Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both 
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between 
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed 
reading of applicable law.  Certainly, if the federal 
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not 
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state 
claims should be dismissed as well.  Similarly, if it 
appears that the state issues substantially 
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of 
the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the 
remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed 
without prejudice and left for resolution to state 
tribunals. 
 
  * * * *  
 
 [Even after the pretrial process has been completed and 
trial commenced,] recognition of a federal court's wide 
latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law 
does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's 
effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state 
law case.  Once it appears that a state claim 
constitutes the real body of a case, to which the 
federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may 
fairly be dismissed. 
 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted). 
 Under Gibbs jurisprudence, where the claim over which the 
district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before 
trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent 
state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative 
justification for doing so.  Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of 
the United States, 843 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1988); Growth Horizons, 
Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993).  Where the 
original federal jurisdiction claim is proceeding to trial, 
however, such considerations will normally counsel an exercise of 
district court jurisdiction over state claims based on the same 
nucleus of operative facts unless the district court can point to 
some substantial countervailing consideration.  This is the 
teaching of our opinion in Sparks v. Hershey, 661 F.2d 30 (3d 
Cir. 1981), where the complaint asserted a civil rights claim 
under § 1983, a state wrongful death claim, and a state survival 
act claim, all based on the same jailhouse suicide.  We there 
observed: 
 We do not hold that where there is a common nucleus of 
operative facts, state claims must always be appended 
to the federal claim; but where, as here, the district 
court does not set forth a persuasive, reasoned 
elaboration for dismissing the state claims, we are 
inclined to believe that the dictates of "judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness to the parties, and 
comity" . . . are better served by recognizing pendent 
jurisdiction.  This is especially true where it is 
desirable to avoid the possibility of duplicating the 
recovery of damages.  Here it is preferable for a 
single fact finder, under proper instruction from the 
court, to consider the varying elements of damages 
recoverable under the federal § 1983 claim and the 
state wrongful death and survival actions . . . .  We 
will therefore reverse the district court's order 
dismissing the pending state claims and direct that 
court to exercise jurisdiction over them. 
 
Sparks, 661 F.2d at 33-34 (citations omitted). 
 Plaintiffs do not suggest that subparagraphs (1), (3), or 
(4) of § 1367(c) are applicable here.  They do maintain that 
their state claims substantially predominate over their federal 
claims and, accordingly, that this case falls within subparagraph 
(2).  The district court is in a better position than we to pass 
upon this contention.  Moreover, even if § 1367(c) does not 
authorize a refusal to hear the state claims based on the current 
record, it might provide that authority at some later stage in 
the proceeding.  Accordingly, the following observations 
concerning § 1367(c)(2) are offered solely by way of guidance and 
are not intended to foreclose the district court from hereafter 
exercising its discretion under § 1367(c) upon appropriate 
application. 
 As we have noted, the "substantially predominates" standard 
of § 1367(c)(2) comes from Gibbs.  It is important to recognize 
that this standard was fashioned as a limited exception to the 
operation of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction -- a doctrine 
that seeks to promote judicial economy, convenience, and fairness 
to litigants by litigating in one case all claims that arise out 
of the same nucleus of operative fact.  When a district court 
exercises its discretion not to hear state claims under 
§ 1367(c)(2), the advantages of a single suit are lost.  For that 
reason, § 1367(c)(2)'s authority should be invoked only where 
there is an important countervailing interest to be served by 
relegating state claims to the state court.  This will normally 
be the case only where "a state claim constitutes the real body 
of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage," 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727 -- only where permitting litigation of all 
claims in the district court can accurately be described as 
allowing a federal tail to wag what is in substance a state dog. 
 Given the origin of the "substantially predominate" 
standard, a district court's analysis under § 1367(c)(2) should 
track the Supreme Court's explication of that standard in Gibbs.  
We do not understand plaintiffs to suggest that there is a 
substantial quantity of evidence supporting their state claims 
that would not be relevant to the federal claims that the 
defendants, acting under color of state law, conspired to violate 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights by assaulting, wrongfully 
arresting, and maliciously prosecuting them.  Thus, in the 
terminology of Gibbs, the state issues would not appear to 
"substantially predominate . . . in terms of proof."  383 U.S. at 
726.  Nor would they appear to "substantially predominate . . . 
in terms of . . . the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought."  
Id.  The remedy sought based on the state claims is the same 
remedy sought based on the federal claims -- damages for the same 
set of injuries to the plaintiffs.  As we observed in Sparks, 661 
F.2d at 33-34, the difficulty of avoiding duplicative recoveries 
is a factor tending to weigh against litigating related federal 
and state claims in different fora. 
 This leaves the issue of whether the state claims can be 
said to "substantially predominate . . . in terms of . . . the 
scope of the issues raised."  Id.  It is true that the state 
claims here outnumber the federal claims.  The "substantially 
predominate" standard, however, is not satisfied simply by a 
numerical count of the state and federal claims the plaintiff has 
chosen to assert on the basis of the same set of facts.  An 
analysis more sensitive to the relevant interests is required. 
 While federal constitutional tort law under § 1983 derives 
much of its content from the general common law of torts, 
plaintiffs' civil rights claims based on the alleged assault, 
arrest, and prosecution are nevertheless governed exclusively by 
federal law.  Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2370-71 (1994).  
While the claims based upon the arrest and the prosecution may 
require an inquiry into whether the defendants had probable cause 
to believe a crime had been committed and this may in part 
require some reference to the state criminal law, the probable 
cause issue and the other issues raised by these claims are 
nevertheless issues of federal law and concern.  E.g. id.; Rose 
v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989); Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 
66 (3d Cir. 1988); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
 There are, to be sure, a complementary set of state law 
issues arising out of the state claims based on the alleged 
assault, arrest, and prosecution.  But these state issues do not 
appear from our vantage point to substantially predominate over 
the comparable but distinct federal issues.  Plaintiffs do not 
suggest that these state issues are more important, more complex, 
more time consuming to resolve, or in any other way more 
significant than their federal counterparts. 
 The only other state issues are those which may arise from 
the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the municipal 
defendants and the DeBartolo defendants.  The dimensions of those 
claims are not clear at this stage of the case, but it seems 
unlikely to us that they will cause the state issues to 
"substantially predominate" within the meaning of § 1367(c)(2).  
If the factual allegations of the complaint are accepted at face 
value, as we are required to do at this point, this case involves 
several substantial claims that the plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights have been infringed.  In such circumstances, we believe it 
will be the rare case, at least, where the addition of 
straightforward negligence claims based on the same facts as the 
constitutional claims will cause the state issues to 
substantially predominate. 
 In short, while we do not foreclose the parties from 
hereafter arguing, and the district court from hereafter 
considering, the issue posed by § 1367(c)(2), we think it 
unlikely that either will be able to point to a countervailing 
interest that would justify bifurcating this case into a federal 
and a state suit that will essentially duplicate each other. 
 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims, 
which arose out of the same incidents and addressed the same 
course of conduct by the defendants; therefore, the federal and 
nonfederal claims were not "separate and independent", and the 
district court had no authority under § 1441(c) to remand either 
part or all of the case.  
 Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.   
